Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly

Pushing Drugs or Pushing the Envelope:
The Prosecution of Doctors in Connection
with Over-Prescribing of
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Introduction
On July 13, 2007, Dr. William Hurwitz was sentenced
to 57 months in federal prison for drug-trafficking.
This result was portrayed by the press as a victory for
the defendant as this conviction and sentence resulted
from a retrial (his original conviction was overturned
by the 4th Circuit) of counts that had originally landed
Hurwitz with a 25-year sentence. But while 57 months
is surely better for the doctor than 25 years, it is still a
troubling sentence for a doctor whom the judge
acknowledged was not motivated by financial gain
and who arguably did much to help both his individual patients and the cause of pain patients generally.
Dr. Hurwitz is one of a growing number of doctors
being prosecuted in federal and state courts for prescribing controlled substances (usually opium-based
drugs) in a manner not authorized by their professional licenses or federal law. The doctors are usually
charged with drug trafficking, but also sometimes with
conspiracy to distribute drugs or even with homicide

When the doctor writes prescriptions in his
office, following consultation with a patient,
and receives no compensation other than the
normal fee for service, can this still be drug
trafficking?

in cases where patients have died. The statute under
which most of these prosecutions occur—the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA)—allows physicians
to prescribe controlled substances (if the physicians are
registered to do so) in the course of medical practice
but prohibits them from distributing drugs outside of
such medical practice. While physician actions that are
deemed to be outside the bounds of reasonable med-

ical care are typically the basis for civil liability for
malpractice only, the Supreme Court has held (as
long ago as 1975) that a medical professional is not
immune from normal criminal liability for drug trafficking. Just because a person holds a medical degree
does not mean that he can simply sell drugs or sell
prescriptions for controlled substances. Such action
constitutes drug trafficking. But when the doctor
writes prescriptions in his office, following consultation with a patient, and receives no compensation
other than the normal fee for service, can this still be
drug trafficking? Recent cases have emphatically
held “yes.” This result makes a kind of sense as well.
After all, an unscrupulous doctor could simply be
writing any and all prescriptions asked for, while
wearing the white coat and doing business in a room
that looks like a doctor’s office. While the doctor is
only getting a routine fee for an office consultation, if
the doctor offers no real medical consultation and
merely sees so-called patients one after the other, dispensing scripts to all-comers, then the fee-for-service
becomes the method of payment for prescriptions
(which enable the “patient” to get access to controlled
drugs). Is this not drug-trafficking merely dressed up
in medical guise?
After all, what makes actions (here writing prescriptions) medical practice? It isn’t just who is doing it. The
white coat and the office setting don’t ensure that
actions constitute medical practice. Perhaps it is
whether the person is being paid money (or something
else) for prescriptions. If so, the actions don’t constitute
medical practice. But once we recognize that this payment can be indirect, like in the scenario described
above, it is unclear whether this test works or instead
devolves into one that focuses on the intentions of the
physician him or herself. If she intends to practice
medicine (and makes money by way of doing so) then
it is medical practice. If she intends to make money by
selling drugs, then it isn’t. But this is a tricky path to
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walk down. Its very structure is reminiscent of debates
about the doctrine of double effect which itself has
proved quite controversial.
Before proceeding down this route, let’s take a closer
look at the legal standard being adopted by courts to
delineate permissible (though potentially negligent)
actions from criminal behavior by physicians. A violation of the Controlled Substances Act requires that the
physician (1) knowingly distribute a controlled substance (2) with knowledge that it is controlled and (3)
that he or she do so “outside the usual course of medical practice.” It is easy to anticipate the problem this
formulation of the legal standard presents. Elements
(1) and (2) require knowledge but that knowledge is
uncontroversial in cases of physician prescribing. The
physician knows that she is writing a prescription (distributing) for a controlled substance and she knows
that the substance is controlled. The controversy surrounds whether the knowledge requirement also modifies element (3). Must the physician know that her
actions are outside the bounds of medical practice?
While a straightforward reading of these elements
would suggest not, this reading seems untenable as it
would criminalize behavior that is merely negligent. It
surely cannot be the case that knowingly prescribing
controlled substances in a manner that a court later
determines is outside the bounds of medical practice
turns one into a drug dealer, can it?
Predictably, most of the challenges to convictions of
physicians under the CSA have focused on whether
the physician is in fact being held criminally responsible for actions that are merely negligent. (Hurwitz
himself had his first conviction overruled by the 4th
Circuit on the grounds that the trial court erroneously
disallowed the jury to consider whether the doctor had
acted in good faith.) But the result of these challenges
has left a patchwork of standards without adequate
analysis of the issues involved and the theories of
criminal responsibility that would animate each of the
various formulations of the legal standard. In what follows, I will argue that the standards (as different courts
are interpreting the requirements of the CSA differently) for criminal liability currently being applied in
courts are problematic for four reasons:

•

•
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First, there is an unresolved ambiguity about
whether in fact doctors are responsible only
when they knowingly prescribe in a manner that
lies outside the bounds of medical practice or if
something less than knowledge will suffice.
This lowering of the standard (from knowledge
to something less) is in part brought about by
courts’ allowing so-called “willful blindness” to
substitute for knowledge.
But, as I will argue, the use of the willful blindness doctrine in this context is inapt in two
ways; these are the second and third problems
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•

with the standard for criminal liability applied
in these cases. Willful blindness requires that an
actor take some action to avoid knowledge. But
in most of the physician prescribing cases, no
such action is present. Moreover (third problem), often the reason the doctor doesn’t know
his patients are abusing or diverting the drugs
is because he trusts his patients. Because the
good physician-patient relationship is built on
trust, the doctor has a good reason to trust his
patient and that distinguishes this situation
from culpable willful blindness.
Finally, the doctor also has an ethical obligation
to put his patient’s needs above those of society.
This asymmetry in the way the doctor ought to
evaluate the harms and benefits of different

Willful blindness requires that an actor take
some action to avoid knowledge.

courses of action may change the assessment of
whether some actions are reckless. Because
some courts treat willful blindness as a form of
extreme recklessness, the fact that actions which
would be reckless if done by others are not
reckless when done by a physician matters to
how courts ought evaluate whether the physician acts culpably in these cases.

Ambiguity about the Standard for Criminal
Responsibility
While courts seem to concede that knowledge is the
appropriate mens rea—the legal term for the mental
state of the actor accused of the crime—for the third
element (acting outside the bounds of medical practice), they back-peddle in interpreting this requirement
in two ways. First, some courts approach this element
by asking whether the doctor acted in “good faith.”
What exactly good faith is and how it should be
assessed is notoriously under-analyzed in law generally and therefore especially problematic when used to
interpret whether someone has violated criminal law.
Some of the courts that see “good faith” as relevant to
whether a physician has violated the CSA understand
good faith as, at least in part, objectively defined.
Indeed, the opinion that reversed Dr. Hurwitz’s original conviction held that “good faith” should be viewed
objectively. If good faith is understood objectively, the
physician can be prosecuted for prescribing in a manner that he should have known exceeds the bounds of
medical practice. Requiring what these courts term
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“objective good faith” abandons the requirement of
knowledge for element (3) and therefore lowers the
standard for a finding of criminal conduct.
Other courts do adopt a subjective test of good
faith—asking whether the physician believed in good
faith that his or her actions exceeded the bounds of
medical practice—but back-peddle as well in a different way. Instead, they allow willful blindness to indicate
that the doctor was prescribing to drug users and dealers to fulfill the knowledge element of the offense.
There is thus an unresolved ambiguity about
whether the physician is criminally responsible only
for knowingly prescribing in a way that lies outside
medical practice or instead whether something less
will satisfy the elements of the offense.

Willful Blindness Requires Avoiding
Information
Willful blindness is seen as the moral or legal equivalent of knowledge in those instances where one deliberately avoids knowing facts that if known would
require (morally or legally) that one desist from ones
actions. The drug courier who never looks in the
pouch he is paid a large sum of money to carry into the
country is willfully blind to the fact that he carries
drugs. Here his willful blindness seems culpable
because he has reason to believe that the pouch may
carry drugs (why else is he offered such a large sum to
There is . . . an unresolved ambiguity about
whether the physician is criminally responsible
only for knowingly prescribing in a way that
lies outside medical practice or instead whether
something less will satisfy the elements of the
offense.
transport it?) and he refrains from investigating in
order to reap some gain. Courts see a parallel in the
doctor cases. The physician who continues to prescribe
drugs to the patient despite numerous “red flags” indicating that the patient may be abusing or selling these
drugs is held to be willfully blind to the fact that he is
dispensing drugs outside the bounds of medical practice. But this parallel may be inapt.
The drug courier avoids gathering information—his
willful blindness results from a choice to avoid taking
some action which would provide the relevant information. In contrast, Dr. Hurwitz didn’t avoid gathering information, rather he failed to make the inferential
leap from this information to the conclusion that his
patients were dealing or using drugs. He didn’t know,
not because he didn’t have the facts that might suggest
such a conclusion. Rather, he didn’t know because

he—perhaps naively—didn’t see the facts he did know
as clearly indicating that his patients were doing these
things. Interestingly the court rejected, mistakenly in
my view, the argument made by Hurwitz’s lawyers
against the inclusion of a willful blindness instruction
to the jury on the grounds that willful blindness
requires that the person take some action to shield
himself from knowledge—which, they argued,
Hurwitz had not done. The failure to draw the reasonable inference from a known set of facts is not the same
as shielding oneself from learning facts one suspects
may be troubling.

Willful Blindness and Trust
Hurwitz argued that he didn’t draw the (perhaps reasonable) inferences from the facts he had because he
was disposed to trust his patients. Compare this to the
drug courier case. In the drug courier case, willful
blindness is culpable because the courier deliberately
decides to remain ignorant for reasons that are at best
morally ambivalent and at worse devious and wrong.
At best, the courier refrains from looking inside the
pouch so that he won’t be faced with the decision
about what to do—knowingly carry the drugs or forgo
the money he’s been paid for transport. At worst, the
courier refrains from looking so that he can carry what
he suspects are drugs but can do so in a manner that
allows him to escape legal liability for doing so knowingly. Hurwitz, by contrast, offers a good reason in
support of his actions. He trusted his patients.
Trust is indisputably a cornerstone of the physicianpatient relationship. There are both instrumental and
non-instrumental justifications for the importance of
trust to this relationship. Trust is instrumentally important because it encourages the free flow of information
by the patient to the doctor, information that may be
critical in accurately diagnosing and treating the
patient. The doctor’s trust in the patient is also important because this display of trust helps the patient to
feel valued and respected. These feelings are especially
important in the case of chronic pain patients (who
made up Dr. Hurwitz’s practice) as such patients are
often shunned by other doctors (who don’t know how
to treat them) or doubted and disbelieved by these
other doctors or by co-workers, family and friends
because they often have no visible or clearly verifiable
injury or disease to point to that accounts for the pain
they suffer. Patients often experience significant mental
suffering from this skepticism and while not as bad as
the physical pain they endure, piles on in a cruel and
difficult way.
Perhaps more controversially, trust is important to
the doctor-patient relationship for non-instrumental
reasons as well. A good doctor trusts his patients.
While this account cannot be fully developed here, the
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The Economy of the Earth
Philosophy, Law, and the Environment
Second edition

Mark Sagoff

Mark Sagoff draws on the last twenty years of debate
over the foundations of environmentalism in this
comprehensive revision of The Economy of the Earth.
Posing questions pertinent to consumption, cost-benefit analysis, the normative implications of neoDarwinism, the role of the natural in national history,
and the centrality of the concept of place in environmental ethics, he analyzes social policy in relation to
the environment, pollution, the workplace, and public safely and health. Sagoff distinguishes ethical
from economic questions and explains which kinds
of concepts, arguments, and processes are appropriate to each.
The second edition incorporates the increasing engagement
of mainstream and evangelical religious communities with
environmental protection into his argument for a democratic environmentalism not constrained by either economics
or science. Sagoff's carefully reasoned and wide ranging
arguments will infuriate economists, ecologists and elite
environmentalists equally, but the book is essential reading
for anyone interested in the future of environmentalism.
—Dan Tarlock, Chicago-Kent College of Law
The Economy of the Earth presents a masterful synthesis of Mark Sagoff's seminal contributions to the theory of
environmental policy analysis. Sagoff argues that good policy design requires accommodation between strongly held,

good doctor does not merely perform a service for the
patient, rather she or he enters into a special sort of
relationship with the patient. It is an imbalanced relationship in which the patient is vulnerable. The good
doctor respects that vulnerability by treating the
patient as much as possible as an equal—by respecting
her autonomy to make decisions (when adequately
informed by the doctor) and by treating her as a person
whose word and reports of symptoms are to be
trusted. If the doctor’s blindness results from his disposition to trust his patients, it is not culpably willfully
blind and therefore ought not to subject the doctor to
criminal sanction.
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incommensurable
moral values. Yet
the techniques of
policy analysis rest
on strong and
sometimes naïve
ethical assumptions. Sagoff shows how careful philosophical reasoning can
reform the practice of policy analysis to better serve the
democratic process. This provocative book deserves a central place in the environmental studies literature.
—Richard B. Howarth, Dartmouth College
The first edition of The Economy of the Earth staked out
a position that many felt but few had said: the most important reasons for protecting nature are moral and aesthetic,
not economic and instrumental. In the second edition, massively revised and updated, Sagoff preaches the same sermon but even more clearly and eloquently. The second
edition of The Economy of the Earth is as vital to debates
about environmental policy as the first edition was in its
time.
—Dale Jamieson, Director of Environmental Studies,
New York University

Cambridge University Press
www.cambridge.org

Putting the Patient First
Some accounts of willful blindness see it as a form of
extreme recklessness. An actor acts recklessly when he
takes a substantial and unjustifiable risk of which she
is aware. The problem with seeing the doctor’s actions
as criminal recklessness is that courts fail to pay attention to the fact that the same action that may be reckless if done by an ordinary person may not be reckless
when done by a physician.
Courts see these pain doctors as acting recklessly
when they prescribe drugs to patients whom the doctor suspects are likely to be abusing or reselling the
drugs. This account may be too simplistic however. It
isn’t reckless to risk a harmful action, even if it is very
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likely to occur, if the harm is significantly smaller than
the harm that inaction may cause. Suppose the likelihood of X occurring if you do Y is 90%. The likelihood
of not-X is thus 10%. If the harm of X is much, much
smaller than the harm of not-X, it may well make sense
to do Y, notwithstanding the likelihood of X occurring
and the harm that X will cause. The definition of recklessness as taking a substantial and unjustifiable risk is
meant to capture this point. The drug courier recklessly brings drugs into the country when he carries
the pouch knowing that is very likely that the pouch
contains drugs because if it does contain drugs, these
will cause significant harm (we assume). But if the
pouch does not contain drugs (unlikely but possible),
failing to bring in the pouch is unlikely to cause significant harm. Without some reason to believe or suspect
that there is some great harm his failure to transport a
legitimate package will cause, the drug courier’s action
is reckless.
Now compare this to Hurwitz’s action. Suppose that
he suspects with a high degree of certainly (90%) that
his patient is using or dealing drugs. If he continues to
write prescriptions for this patient, he yet may not be
reckless. To see why, suppose he is wrong and his
The physician must care more for his patient’s
suffering than for the harm to society and this
obligation puts an extra thumb on the scale in
favor of prescribing despite the risk that the
patient is selling the drugs.

patient is not using or dealing but legitimately needs
the drugs to curb her crushing pain. If so, then failing
to prescribe to her will cause terrible harm. Because
this harm may be significantly greater (failing to
relieve awful suffering) than the harm caused by facilitating access to drugs to users or dealers, the doctor’s
action may not be reckless. And this is so even when
the likelihood that the patient is using or dealing is significantly greater than the likelihood that she is legitimately in need.
Further, the doctor does not approach these harms
neutrally. Rather, he is obligated to care more about
alleviating the suffering of his patient than he cares
about avoiding harm to society. The physician’s obligation of loyalty to his patient requires him to help his
patient, to care especially about alleviating her suffering, when possible. Special relationships, like parent/child, doctor/patient, friend/friend, allow or even
require the participants to value the interests of the
related person more than the interests of others. So the
physician confronted with the possibility—even a
probability—that he may be writing a prescription for
a patient who will abuse or sell the drugs prescribed
does not simply reason that it would be reckless to

continue because there is a significant likelihood of
harm. He must also ask himself what would be the
harm of failing to prescribe if his patient is legitimately
in need. If that is great, it might outweigh the likelier
harm of prescribing to the user even for the neutral
observer. For the physician, however, the considerations are not to be weighed neutrally. The physician
must care more for his patient’s suffering than for the
harm to society and this obligation puts an extra
thumb on the scale in favor of prescribing despite the
risk that the patient is selling the drugs.
Finally, the above discussion overly simplifies the
analysis by avoiding the most difficult and troubling
sort of case: the patient whom the doctor both believes
is in pain and suspects is selling some of his medication (perhaps even in order to make money to afford
the pain medication for herself). In one of the tape
recordings secretly made of Dr. Hurwitz during the
time that he was under investigation, he says “that it
was ‘not inconceivable’ to him that some patients were
‘selling part of their medicines so they could buy the
rest.” Whether continuing to prescribe drugs to such a
person is “unjustified”—in the way that the Model
Penal Code envisions in its definition of recklessness—
is far from clear. While the Drug Enforcement Agency
appears to take the position that doing so is not permissible, the doctor’s professional obligations push in
the other direction.

What Is “Medical Practice”?
If we reject the appropriateness of using willful blindness to substitute for the mens rea of knowledge in the
context of prosecuting doctors for their prescribing
practices, where does this leave us? The prosecution
must show, in such cases, that the doctor knowingly
prescribed in a manner “outside the usual course of
medical practice.” But this formulation raises as many
questions as it answers. What is it that the doctor must
know? That he is prescribing to drug dealers or
addicts? That he is prescribing in a way that he
believes lies outside the bounds of medical practice?
That he is balancing the harms of prescribing to drug
users and dealers versus the harms of failing to prescribe to legitimate patients in a vastly different way
than how other doctors would balance such harms?
Ambiguity abounds. Let me focus on just one of the
possible objects of the physician’s knowledge and
explore its complexities.
When we say that the doctor must knowingly act in
a manner that is “outside the usual course of medical
practice,” do we mean that he knowingly acts in a way
that the medical profession considers to be outside the
bounds of medical practice (medical practice defined
objectively), or do we mean that he knowingly acts in a
way that he believes is outside the bounds of medical
practice rightly conceived (medical practice defined
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subjectively)? This question returns us to the inquiry
that lies at the heart of this issue and that I flagged at
the beginning of this piece: what is medical practice? Is
medical practice to be defined by what the community
of practicing physicians believe is medical practice?
Medical malpractice law is built on such an idea. But
this doesn’t resolve the issue for our purposes here.
The focus of medical malpractice is incompetence—
which practices of medicine (whatever that is) fall
below the standard for how such practices are to be
carried out? Our focus is more basic—we are asking
what defines or delineates the practice of medicine,
rather than what instances of the practice of medicine
do it so poorly as to be considered incompetent
(though no one disputes they are still the practice of
medicine).
In particular, we are asking whether medical practice
encompasses practices that push the envelope. Research
science is innovative—innovation is an integral part of
what it is to be a researcher. But what of medicine? Is
innovation a part of the practice of medicine? While it
is surely not as central as it is to the research enterprise,
it would be odd for the law to define the practice of
medicine in such a way that it forbids innovative practice. This conclusion suggests that the practice of medicine cannot simply be defined by what the community
of doctors currently think constitutes medical practice.
But does such an account allow a rogue physician to do
whatever he wants (sell prescriptions for money and
call that “medical practice”)? Clearly not. However, it is
unlikely such a physician honestly believes that constitutes medical practice. Moreover, a jury would still be
entitled to assess whether it believes the doctor’s claim
that he was doing what he honestly believes constitutes practicing medicine. Moreover, medical malpractice (and the civil sanctions it carries) will continue to
provide limits to physician action. When patients
believe they have been treated in a manner that falls
below professional competence, patients can choose to
sue. But while failed innovative procedures could constitute medical malpractice, they would not subject the
physician to criminal liability for practicing outside the
bounds of medicine.
Ironically, US District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema,
who presided over the retrial of William Hurwitz,
explained before hearing arguments related to his sentencing, that in the years between the first trial and the
re-sentencing in the summer of 2007, the level of expertise about the proper way to treat chronic pain patients
had advanced considerably. In particular she emphasized that experts now agree that there is no upper
limit on the amount of opioids that can safely and
appropriately be prescribed to such patients. Dr.
Hurwitz’s practice was on the vanguard of these
changes. And yet, the judge did not find that these
facts provided a reason to grant the defendant’s motion
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for an acquittal. In denying that motion, Brinkema
stated that the physician seems to have a “God-complex” rather than to be motivated by financial gain. But
as she saw it, this was no reason to find the case not
one of drug-trafficking. But having a God-complex is
not criminal, one would think. Moreover, one is left
wondering what true innovators are free from the kind
of arrogance she attributes to Hurwitz. Innovative
practice should be viewed as part of the practice of
medicine. When done unreasonably, it may constitute
medical malpractice but no more. Pushing the envelope is not morally or legally equivalent to pushing
drugs.
Deborah Hellman
Visiting Professor of Law
University of Pennsylvania Law School
dhellman@law.upenn.edu

Sources: The Supreme Court held that a medical professional is not immune from normal
criminal liability for drug trafficking in United
States v. Moore, 423 US 122 (1975); the requirements for violation of the Controlled Substances
Act occurs in US v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 556; for
a case that adopted a subjective test of good
faith, see: US v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F. 3d. 1132,
1138 (1994), and the court that heard the retrial
of Hurwitz’s case allowed the jury to convict on
the basis of willful blindness. The term “red
flags” is used both in legal cases and by the
Drug Enforcement Agency. David Luban,
“Contrived Ignorance,” 87 Georgetown Law
Journal 957 (1999). According to the Model
Penal Code, willful blindness acts as a substitute for knowledge precisely because the actor
knows, at the least, that there is a high probability that his actions are illegal: “When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an
element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability
of its existence, unless he actually believes that
it does not exist.” Model Penal Code § 2.02 (7)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). Commentary to
the Code suggests that this expansion of the
concept of knowledge is meant to accommodate
cases of willful blindness. Model Penal Code §
2.02 (2) cmt. 9. The discussion of the tape made
of Dr. Hurwitz discussing the possibility that
some patients were “selling part of their medicines so they could buy the rest” occurs at US v.
Hurwitz, 459 F. 3d. 463, 467 (2006).

